OPERATION LOVE III:  The Mindoro Landings



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A view of F6F Hellcats spotted on the flight deck of TICONDEROGA CV-14 as she steams back into Ulithi Anchorage on 8 December 1944.  Her task group, including ASTORIA CL-90, had just completed a week of training exercises.  Three days later they would get underway for the real thing.
-U.S.Navy photo


8 December 1944
As ASTORIA and her task group completed training exercises, the Fast Carrier Task Force was preparing to put to sea for the next phase of the Philippine Liberation:  the invasion of Mindoro, code-named Operation LOVE III.  The island of Mindoro, just south of Luzon, was ideal for establishing airfields that could support the ultimate goal: landings on Luzon.  While seaborne forces came ashore at Mindoro, aircraft from the fast carriers would play a suppression role over Japanese airfields across Luzon, preventing enemy air power from playing a role as it had at Leyte.



Japanese airfield locations across Luzon and the northern Philippines.  The red arrows indicate the approach of MacArthur's Mindoro invasion force on 15 December.  The blue arrow indicates the approach by the Fast Carrier Task Force that would take place a day earlier, positioning the carriers to provide blanketing cover over airfields across Luzon.
-map modified from The Liberation of the Philippines, Morison


The introduction of Kamikaze tactics during Leyte operations had taken its toll on the fast carriers; three had left the fleet for repairs at Pearl Harbor and several others had been damaged.  Eliminating the threat of further suicide attacks was a high priority for Admiral Halsey and his top leadership.  To counter these new Japanese tactics, the Fast Carrier Task Force (referred to during Halsey's watch as Task Force 38) made several significant changes to their operations.

The first measure was to increase antiaircraft protection for the carriers.  ASTORIA had already been fitted out following shakedown with heavier AA armament and had performed intense practice against aerial targets before joining the fleet.  Now she joined the fast carriers during a large reorganization as Halsey consolidated his forces from four carrier task groups down to three.  This was due in part to the absence of carriers limping back to Hawaii, but also allowed greater concentration of antiaircraft screen by bolstering the number of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers that surrounded each carrier group.

The second measure was earlier identification of Japanese suicide planes before they reached the carriers.  To accomplish this, destroyers were to be set on “Tom Cat” picket duty, 60 miles forward of the fast carrier task groups along the path of U.S. fighters and bombers returning from raids over their targets.  This strategy would weed out “Tail-end Charlies,” Japanese planes that tucked in behind returning American formations to mask their approach.

The third and most preventative measure was to keep Japanese planes from getting airborne to begin with.  USN and USMC fighter units were effectively doubled in the fast carriers' arsenal, changing from 38 to 73 Hellcat and Corsair fighters per carrier, at the expense of a reduction in dive bombers.  These additional fighters, including radar-equipped night fighters, were to provide a "Big Blue Blanket"of 24-hour air cover over Luzon airfields.  If this strategy worked, the majority of Japanese planes would be destroyed on the ground.

The man primarily responsible for these new strategies was the Fast Carrier Task Force commander, Vice Admiral John "Slew" McCain.  For Mindoro operations, McCain designated USS HANCOCK CV-19 in Task Group 38.2 as his flagship.  "Point Two" was ASTORIA's group, and protecting task force flagships became a role she would grow accustomed to in the months that followed.



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ESSEX-class fast carriers lined up in what came to be referred to as "Murderer's Row" after the hard-slugging New York Yankees lineup.  Front to back are WASP CV-18, YORKTOWN CV-10, HORNET CV-12, HANCOCK CV-19, and TICONDEROGA CV-14, with the "Blue Ghost," LEXINGTON CV-16, at upper left.  This photo was taken on 8 December 1944 as final preparations were underway for Mindoro operations.
-U.S.Navy photo in NARA collection



A second photo of "Murderer's Row."  The carriers are lined up by task group, with TG 38.1 in the foreground, TG 38.2 in the center, and TG 38.3 in the background.  ASTORIA was assigned to screen HORNET and HANCOCK (3rd and 4th from front) during Mindoro operations, along with LEXINGTON CV-16 (just out of picture at left).
-U.S.Navy photo reproduced from www.navsource.org


11 December 1944
From Halsey's Typhoon:
At daybreak on December 11, Ulithi harbor was a whorl of activity.  Gangs brought anchors to short stay and battle guidons whipped in the breeze as the ninety-odd ships of Task Force 38 steamed Indian-file at five-hundred yard intervals through Ulithi's Mugai [Channel], the only navigable passage into and out of the vast anchorage.

On either side of this nautical parade, sailors cheered from the rails of the hundreds of Third Fleet auxiliaries remaining behind...  Overhead, land-based combat patrols formed a two-tiered umbrella guarding against stray bandits from Yap Island.  Yet despite the "sortie fever," it was a tranquil, almost idyllic morning...

From the Mighty Ninety cruise book:
On the 11^th of December we steamed out of Ulithi Atoll in company with Task Force 38 and started our first war job.  We were all pretty excited because we didn’t know quite what to expect.

CL-90 sailor Herb Blodgett wrote that the Mighty Ninety put to sea with "what seemed like 100 ships," a number that was not far off. 


Task Force 38 Order of Battle at the outset of OPERATION LOVE III
Commander Task Force: Vice Admiral John S. McCain

Task Group 38.1       (Rear Admiral Montgomery)
Fleet Carriers:           YORKTOWN CV-10
                                    WASP CV-18
Light Carriers:           COWPENS CVL-25
                                    MONTEREY CVL-26
Battleships:                MASSACHUSETTS BB-59
                                    ALABAMA BB-60
Heavy Cruisers:        NEW ORLEANS CA-32
                                    SAN FRANCISCO CA-38
                                    BALTIMORE CA-68
AA Cruiser:                SAN DIEGO CL-53
Destroyers:                18 DD

Task Group 38.2       (Rear Admiral Gerald C. Bogan)
Fleet Carriers:            HORNET CV-12
                                    LEXINGTON CV-16
                                    HANCOCK CV-19
Light Carriers:           INDEPENDENCE CVL-22
                                    CABOT CVL-28  
Battleships:                IOWA BB-61
                                    NEW JERSEY BB-62
                                    WISCONSIN BB-64
Light Cruisers:           VINCENNES CL-64
                                    PASADENA CL-65
                                    MIAMI CL-89
                                    ASTORIA CL-90                                    
AA Cruiser:                SAN JUAN CL-54
Destroyers:                20 DD

Task Group 38.3       (Rear Admiral Frederic C. Sherman)
Fleet Carriers:            ESSEX CV-9
                                    TICONDEROGA CV-14
Light Carriers:           LANGLEY CVL-27 
                                    SAN JACINTO CVL-30
Battleships:                NORTH CAROLINA BB-55
                                    WASHINGTON BB-56
                                    SOUTH DAKOTA BB-57
Light Cruisers:           MOBILE CL-63
                                    BILOXI CL-80
                                    SANTA FE CL-60
AA Cruiser:                OAKLAND CL-95
Destroyers:                18 DD



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Offset fire from USS WISCONSIN BB-64 splashes behind USS ASTORIA during firing practice, 11 December 1944.
-photo taken by and courtesy of USS ASTORIA ship's photographer Herman Schnipper

13 December 1944
After steaming northwest for two days, the fast carriers rendezvoused with their logistics support group, TG30.8, for their first underway replenishment of the operation.  The oilers of TG30.8 had left Ulithi the day before the fast carriers and taken up position northeast of the Philippines.  At the rendezvous point, the ships of TF38 topped off with oil in final preparation for their offensive operations in LOVE III.

Late in the afternoon, a flight of Japanese suicide planes attacked MacArthur's invasion forces as they approached Mindoro from the Sulu Sea.  The light cruiser USS NASHVILLE CL-43 was struck amidships by a bomb-laden Kamikaze with devastating results--131 men killed, 192 wounded.  Two hours later, a second plane slammed into the destroyer HARADEN DD-585.  The need for air cover from the carriers was becoming critical to the success of the operation.

Overnight the task force began a fast run-in toward the coast of Luzon, where waves of carrier planes were to be launched before first light against installations and airbases across the island.  Meanwhile the logistics support group maintained their position northeast of Luzon in preparation for the return of a depleted TF38 three days later.



This track chart shows where Task Force 38 met up with Task Group 30.8 and topped off for their run-in on Luzon, 13 December 1944. 
-imagery by NASA and manipulated using Google Earth
-coordinates from original CL-90 documentation courtesy of US Navy Historian Robert A. Migliorisi


14 December 1944
The Fast Carrier Task Force took up position less than 90 miles east of Luzon and launched aircraft to fly suppressive cover.  The convoys of invasion craft would reach Mindoro to begin landings the next morning, and the fast carriers were determined to keep Japanese aircraft on the ground.

For the next three days, this suppression strategy worked magnificently.  From Morison's Liberation of the Philippines:
Since the primary task was to blanket the airfields, no large-scale destruction resulted from the raids of 14-16 December; none had been contemplated.  Out of 1671 sorties flown, 1427 were fighter planes and only 244 were bombers.  Only 336 tons of bombs were dropped altogether, as compared with the 300 tons per day which had formerly been typical of Task Force 38 strikes.  Nevertheless, by these raids Admirals Halsey and McCain accomplished what they set out to do.  With the exception of the one Japanese strike that took off before 14 December, no Luzon-based aircraft attacked our Mindoro-bound shipping...

Additionally, not a single Japanese plane penetrated the defensive air cover put in place surrounding the Fast Carrier Task Force.  The only attempt came from a flight of eleven planes that were shot down by Combat Air Patrol from two of ASTORIA's carriers, HANCOCK and LEXINGTON.  Of 270 total enemy planes destroyed, 208 of them never left the ground.  in return, American aircraft losses totaled 54, only half of which came from aerial combat.

McCain's response to Kamikaze tactics had worked well.  So well, in fact, that ASTORIA had little more to do during Mindoro operations than maintain her position in formation, her crew watching while wave after wave of planes took off and landed from the carriers in her group.



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F6F Hellcats fly over USS ASTORIA during Mindoro operations, 15 December 1944.
-photo taken by and courtesy of USS ASTORIA ship's photographer Herman Schnipper



The results of the kamikaze attack on NASHVILLE CL-43 from 13 December 1944.  This photograph depicts a similar deck area to the image below taken of PHOENIX CL-46, a sister BROOKLYN-Class cruiser, within days of each other.
-U.S.Navy photo reproduced from www.navsource.org



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Antiaircraft crews of USS PHOENIX CL-46 look skyward to identify a potential Japanese aircraft off Mindoro, 15 December 1944.  Thanks to the "Big Blue Blanket" of Task Force 38, no aerial threats ever materialized once carrier operations began over Luzon.
-U.S. Navy Photo in NARA collection



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In a closeup from the previous photo, the ever-present tension surrounding the Kamikaze threat is apparent on the faces of sailors in anti-flash gear.  It would be months before the American public would learn of Kamikaze tactics.
-closeup from U.S. Navy Photo in NARA collection


16 December 1944
Following their third consecutive day of flight operations over Luzon, The Fast Carrier Task Force retired from the Philippines and steamed toward the next rendezvous with their oilers for refuel and resupply.  Halsey's plan was to perform a quick underway replenishment and get back to the Philippines, but the Pacific Ocean had other plans in store for USS ASTORIA and her task force.


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Sources:

Blodgett, Herbert.  "Remembering Typhoon Cobra."  U.S. Navy Cruiser Sailors Association Quarterly, Summer 2006, pp. 29-30.

Breuer, William B.  Retaking the Philippines.  New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Calhoun, C. Raymond.  Typhoon: The Other Enemy.  Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

Drury, Bob and Clavin, Tom.  Halsey’s Typhoon.  New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007.