MIGHTY NINETY
The Homepage of USS ASTORIA CL-90
Chapter 7: Typhoon COBRA
CLICK PHOTO TO ENLARGE
Waves break over the bow of an oiler from Task Group 30.8 as refueling attempts begin in the morning of 17 December 1944. The weather progressively worsened throughout the day.
-U.S.Navy photo in NARA collection
16 December 1944
Late in the afternoon, Task Force 38 broke off from the Philippines and began the 400 mile trip east to rendezvous with their logistics support group, Task Group 30.8. The rendezvous point was beyond the range of Japanese fighters, yet allowed for the quickest possible return to coverage of Luzon airfields.
Although it would only later become clear, this underway replenishment placed the fleet directly in the path of a growing pacific storm. The storm, the first to be christened by the U.S. Navy Aerological Division, became known as Typhoon Cobra.
The storm had been recorded as a "tropical disturbance" the day previous, but it was estimated to be moving north-northwest on a course that would take it hundreds of miles from the fleet. This error in estimation was to be the first of many.
CLICK IMAGE TO ENLARGE
This track chart depicts the collision course of USS ASTORIA and Third Fleet (gray line) with Typhoon Cobra (red line) from 16-17 December 1944. The path of the storm was never correctly determined until the fleet was in the heart of it.
-created from Google Earth global mapping and imagery
CLICK PHOTO TO ENLARGE
Waves break over the bow of an oiler from Task Group 30.8 as refueling attempts begin in the morning of 17 December 1944. The weather progressively worsened throughout the day.
-U.S.Navy photo in NARA collection
16 December 1944
Late in the afternoon, Task Force 38 broke off from the Philippines and began the 400 mile trip east to rendezvous with their logistics support group, Task Group 30.8. The rendezvous point was beyond the range of Japanese fighters, yet allowed for the quickest possible return to coverage of Luzon airfields.
Although it would only later become clear, this underway replenishment placed the fleet directly in the path of a growing pacific storm. The storm, the first to be christened by the U.S. Navy Aerological Division, became known as Typhoon Cobra.
The storm had been recorded as a "tropical disturbance" the day previous, but it was estimated to be moving north-northwest on a course that would take it hundreds of miles from the fleet. This error in estimation was to be the first of many.
CLICK IMAGE TO ENLARGE
This track chart depicts the collision course of USS ASTORIA and Third Fleet (gray line) with Typhoon Cobra (red line) from 16-17 December 1944. The path of the storm was never correctly determined until the fleet was in the heart of it.
-created from Google Earth global mapping and imagery
17 December 1944
0800
Fueling was difficult from the very start as wind and seas began to pick up. USS ASTORIA sailor Deno Dolci recalled that "we had a hell of a time getting the lines over, the waves were so high. All hands were called up to carry supplies."
1200
Conditions worsened throughout the morning as ships attempted to refuel. In one incident, the destroyer MADDOX had a fueling line break, almost causing a collision with her oiler MANATEE. The escort carrier KWAJALEIN, attempting to transfer replacement planes and pilots to the fast carriers, canceled all air operations and personnel transfers. Her crew focused instead on lashing planes to the deck with steel cables and deflating their tires. Before the day was through, this practice would be adopted by carriers throughout the fleet.
A FLETCHER-class destroyer deep in a trough between high waves as the seas continue to build.
-U.S. Navy photo in NARA collection
Another view of a FLETCHER-class destroyer, her bow plunging into a trough.
-U.S. Navy photo in NARA collection
At 1251 Admiral Halsey ordered all ships to cancel fueling attempts for the day and steam northwest; a second rendezvous would be attempted the next morning at 0600. Halsey made this decision based on the conclusion that the storm was moving away to the north. This new location would keep the fleet close to Luzon yet out of enemy fighter range, allowing the fast carriers to stay on schedule and get back into action two days later. In reality, the storm was 300 miles closer than realized and bearing down on the fleet.
1500
The seas had become too rough for aircraft recovery operations. The last two planes returning from Combat Air Patrol were ordered to ditch in the ocean. Their pilots bailed out and were recovered by a destroyer.
Captains across the fleet were beginning to make forecasts and predictions, and much talk between ships was taking place. It became consensus that the new refueling point lay in the path of the storm, a notion that was closer to the mark but still not accurate.
At 1533 Halsey waved off the second rendezvous point and designated a third one, much farther to the south. He directed the fleet to a new heading of due west, 270 degrees. Halsey's ships now ran parallel to the storm's path and slightly ahead of it. The fleet began to gradually outpace the weather and conditions improved somewhat, creating a false sense of security.
2200
Ominous signs remained as night fell. Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that "a sinister afterglow remained in the sky. The sea was deep black except where the wind whipped off wave crests into spindrift." The seas continued to mount and formation zigzagging was canceled.
Halsey realized that his ships would not be able to make the rendezvous point by morning, so late in the evening he changed the location of the refueling rendezvous yet again. This final location was believed to provide more favorable weather while still maintaining a safe distance from Japanese airfields. Unfortunately, this decision pulled the fleet directly back into the path of the advancing storm.
0800
Fueling was difficult from the very start as wind and seas began to pick up. USS ASTORIA sailor Deno Dolci recalled that "we had a hell of a time getting the lines over, the waves were so high. All hands were called up to carry supplies."
1200
Conditions worsened throughout the morning as ships attempted to refuel. In one incident, the destroyer MADDOX had a fueling line break, almost causing a collision with her oiler MANATEE. The escort carrier KWAJALEIN, attempting to transfer replacement planes and pilots to the fast carriers, canceled all air operations and personnel transfers. Her crew focused instead on lashing planes to the deck with steel cables and deflating their tires. Before the day was through, this practice would be adopted by carriers throughout the fleet.
A FLETCHER-class destroyer deep in a trough between high waves as the seas continue to build.
-U.S. Navy photo in NARA collection
Another view of a FLETCHER-class destroyer, her bow plunging into a trough.
-U.S. Navy photo in NARA collection
At 1251 Admiral Halsey ordered all ships to cancel fueling attempts for the day and steam northwest; a second rendezvous would be attempted the next morning at 0600. Halsey made this decision based on the conclusion that the storm was moving away to the north. This new location would keep the fleet close to Luzon yet out of enemy fighter range, allowing the fast carriers to stay on schedule and get back into action two days later. In reality, the storm was 300 miles closer than realized and bearing down on the fleet.
1500
The seas had become too rough for aircraft recovery operations. The last two planes returning from Combat Air Patrol were ordered to ditch in the ocean. Their pilots bailed out and were recovered by a destroyer.
Captains across the fleet were beginning to make forecasts and predictions, and much talk between ships was taking place. It became consensus that the new refueling point lay in the path of the storm, a notion that was closer to the mark but still not accurate.
At 1533 Halsey waved off the second rendezvous point and designated a third one, much farther to the south. He directed the fleet to a new heading of due west, 270 degrees. Halsey's ships now ran parallel to the storm's path and slightly ahead of it. The fleet began to gradually outpace the weather and conditions improved somewhat, creating a false sense of security.
2200
Ominous signs remained as night fell. Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that "a sinister afterglow remained in the sky. The sea was deep black except where the wind whipped off wave crests into spindrift." The seas continued to mount and formation zigzagging was canceled.
Halsey realized that his ships would not be able to make the rendezvous point by morning, so late in the evening he changed the location of the refueling rendezvous yet again. This final location was believed to provide more favorable weather while still maintaining a safe distance from Japanese airfields. Unfortunately, this decision pulled the fleet directly back into the path of the advancing storm.
18 December 1944
0500
Conditions grew worse overnight. Shortly after 0500 the fourth fueling rendezvous was called off completely and all ships were ordered to head due south to escape the storm. Several destroyers were at critically low fuel levels; they made attempts to refuel that proved dangerous and futile.
0800
Spread out over many miles of ocean, the ships of Third Fleet were having very different experiences. In ASTORIA's task group weather conditions were relatively mild; HANCOCK recorded only "scattered showers" until "heavy continuous rain" began at 0800.
However, for ships nearest to the storm, conditions were so bad that two escort carriers requested permission to break formation and fend for themselves. From Morison's Liberation of the Philippines:
Salt water was blowing horizontally at bridge level. There seemed to be no separation between sea and sky. The sound of the wind in the rigging, especially in the large "bedspring" radar, was frightening.
USS COWPENS CVL-25 takes a heavy roll to starboard on the morning of 18 December 1944. Note that in addition to her planes, a jeep has been secured to the deck with wheels chocked.
-U.S.Navy photo reproduced from Wikimedia Commons
Another shot of USS COWPENS CVL-25 in a starboard roll. The photo was taken from an outboard gun sponson and illustrates the height of the waves during the morning. Within hours after this photo COWPENS suffered significant fire damage.
-U.S.Navy photo
0500
Conditions grew worse overnight. Shortly after 0500 the fourth fueling rendezvous was called off completely and all ships were ordered to head due south to escape the storm. Several destroyers were at critically low fuel levels; they made attempts to refuel that proved dangerous and futile.
0800
Spread out over many miles of ocean, the ships of Third Fleet were having very different experiences. In ASTORIA's task group weather conditions were relatively mild; HANCOCK recorded only "scattered showers" until "heavy continuous rain" began at 0800.
However, for ships nearest to the storm, conditions were so bad that two escort carriers requested permission to break formation and fend for themselves. From Morison's Liberation of the Philippines:
Salt water was blowing horizontally at bridge level. There seemed to be no separation between sea and sky. The sound of the wind in the rigging, especially in the large "bedspring" radar, was frightening.
USS COWPENS CVL-25 takes a heavy roll to starboard on the morning of 18 December 1944. Note that in addition to her planes, a jeep has been secured to the deck with wheels chocked.
-U.S.Navy photo reproduced from Wikimedia Commons
Another shot of USS COWPENS CVL-25 in a starboard roll. The photo was taken from an outboard gun sponson and illustrates the height of the waves during the morning. Within hours after this photo COWPENS suffered significant fire damage.
-U.S.Navy photo
0900
Across the fleet individual dramas began to be reported over Talk Between Ships. The light carrier USS INDEPENDENCE reported a man overboard; another followed within minutes. At the same time, aircraft broke loose from their cables on the hangar deck of USS MONTEREY and exploded into flames. The crew of the MONTEREY spent the next hour working to bring fires under control as she slowed and lost steerage.
From his post in CIC, ASTORIA sailor Clancy Allen heard destroyers radio throughout the morning requesting to break formation--a request that was denied. He recalled:
We were rolling so badly, everyone had to tie themselves into their chairs to keep from sliding around the compartment. It was very tiring--always having to brace yourself or hold onto something.
1000
It was becoming apparent what the fleet was dealing with. Barometer readings fell very rapidly and winds began backing counterclockwise, both tell-tale signs of a typhoon.
USS WISCONSIN radioed that one of her Kingfisher floatplanes had been torn from her deck. A few minutes later the cruisers BOSTON and MIAMI also reported planes washed overboard. Shortly afterward, USS COWPENS became the second carrier to report hangar deck fires from loose aircraft.
USS ASTORIA was also feeling the effects of the typhoon. From the Mighty Ninety cruise book:
It was pretty rough that morning and the waves were higher than the bridge, but it was so novel that we didn’t realize the danger until it was all over.
Echoing the sentiment, ASTORIA sailor Herbert Blodgett later wrote:
We had an inclinometer somewhere, maybe in the engine room. We watched it with growing wonderment (I don't remember any fear) as it swung ever further until it began hitting 42 degrees with regularity. The pitching was not very noticeable in our space, but when I was relieved and had a chance to go up for a look topside, it was mesmerizing.
USS LANGLEY CVL-27 rolls heavily to starboard on the morning of 18 December 1944. At left Halsey's flagship NEW JERSEY BB-62 maintains an even keel, illustrating the relative stability of different types of ships caught in the typhoon.
-U.S. Navy photo in NARA collection
Across the fleet individual dramas began to be reported over Talk Between Ships. The light carrier USS INDEPENDENCE reported a man overboard; another followed within minutes. At the same time, aircraft broke loose from their cables on the hangar deck of USS MONTEREY and exploded into flames. The crew of the MONTEREY spent the next hour working to bring fires under control as she slowed and lost steerage.
From his post in CIC, ASTORIA sailor Clancy Allen heard destroyers radio throughout the morning requesting to break formation--a request that was denied. He recalled:
We were rolling so badly, everyone had to tie themselves into their chairs to keep from sliding around the compartment. It was very tiring--always having to brace yourself or hold onto something.
1000
It was becoming apparent what the fleet was dealing with. Barometer readings fell very rapidly and winds began backing counterclockwise, both tell-tale signs of a typhoon.
USS WISCONSIN radioed that one of her Kingfisher floatplanes had been torn from her deck. A few minutes later the cruisers BOSTON and MIAMI also reported planes washed overboard. Shortly afterward, USS COWPENS became the second carrier to report hangar deck fires from loose aircraft.
USS ASTORIA was also feeling the effects of the typhoon. From the Mighty Ninety cruise book:
It was pretty rough that morning and the waves were higher than the bridge, but it was so novel that we didn’t realize the danger until it was all over.
Echoing the sentiment, ASTORIA sailor Herbert Blodgett later wrote:
We had an inclinometer somewhere, maybe in the engine room. We watched it with growing wonderment (I don't remember any fear) as it swung ever further until it began hitting 42 degrees with regularity. The pitching was not very noticeable in our space, but when I was relieved and had a chance to go up for a look topside, it was mesmerizing.
USS LANGLEY CVL-27 rolls heavily to starboard on the morning of 18 December 1944. At left Halsey's flagship NEW JERSEY BB-62 maintains an even keel, illustrating the relative stability of different types of ships caught in the typhoon.
-U.S. Navy photo in NARA collection
1200
At 1228 another light carrier reported fires--USS CAPE ESPERANCE. Her planes had broken loose on the flight deck, flames were rising to the height of the bridge, and the ship was in serious jeopardy of being lost. USS MIAMI was detached from Cruiser Division 17 and ordered to stand by CAPE ESPERANCE. Fortunately wind and sea extinguished the fires, clearing burning aircraft from her flight deck and reducing her topside weight. CAPE ESPERANCE was saved by the storm that had threatened her.
Shortly afterward, MIAMI "took a series of heavy seas that buckled her shell, main deck and longitudinals from the stem to about frame 22." Her bow was bent six inches to port.
Although MIAMI was the only cruiser to suffer structural damage in the typhoon, ASTORIA sailor Deno Dolci thought otherwise at the time. While enduring "ninety-foot seas, higher than the ship's bridge," Dolci remembers "hearing the rivets creaking below decks."
From Morison's Liberation of the Philippines:
[By afternoon] every ship was laboring heavily; hardly any two were in visual contact; many lay dead, rolling in the trough of the sea... Sailors peered out on such a scene as they had never witnessed before, and hoped to never see again. The weather was so thick and dirty that sea and sky seemed fused in one aqueous element.
Herbert Blodgett later wrote:
All hands had been warned to stay inside and not go out on the weather decks, so naturally I made my way up inside the aft superstructure as high as I could go (there was no one on duty in that whole area who might have stopped me.) I stepped out on a tiny platform at the highest point and just held on tight to watch the spectacle.
As I stood there in the aft fire control area I watched with tremendous interest as the ASTORIA rolled from side to side while pitching up and down like a cork. The most fascinating thing to see was to watch the bow struggle to come up from under water, shaking, quivering, creating spray that came back over the bridge, all the way back to me, soaking me to the skin.
USS ASTORIA ship's photographer Herman Schnipper recalled:
The typhoon was so intense that we were prevented from going topside for fear of being washed overboard. I could not use my photo equipment during the typhoon because of the soaking rain and heavy seas. If you looked up, you would see a wall of water come crashing down over the ship.
We were not able to use the hatchways and the watertight doors were too hard to handle. I was being slammed against the bulkheads as I managed to slowly make my way down the ship's passageways as it rolled and pitched--as if it were a cork on the open seas.
I managed to reach the bridge, where I could read the inclinometer. It indicated how much the ship was rolling before it would capsize, which it came very close to doing. I then tried to take pictures of the surrounding seas and ships from the bridge, but I could not see through all that water for almost two days.
1800
By early evening the worst of the storm had passed. Third Fleet was scattered over an area of 3000 square miles of ocean. Although several ships had already been directed back to Ultihi for repair, the overall state of the fleet had yet to be ascertained. At 1848 Halsey ordered a search to begin for men overboard.
From Calhoun's Typhoon: the Other Enemy:
As the 18th of December passed into history, the Commander Third Fleet could not possibly have had any real appreciation of the magnitude of the disaster that had just befallen his ships. Not until the 19th did the tragic picture begin to unfold.
At 1228 another light carrier reported fires--USS CAPE ESPERANCE. Her planes had broken loose on the flight deck, flames were rising to the height of the bridge, and the ship was in serious jeopardy of being lost. USS MIAMI was detached from Cruiser Division 17 and ordered to stand by CAPE ESPERANCE. Fortunately wind and sea extinguished the fires, clearing burning aircraft from her flight deck and reducing her topside weight. CAPE ESPERANCE was saved by the storm that had threatened her.
Shortly afterward, MIAMI "took a series of heavy seas that buckled her shell, main deck and longitudinals from the stem to about frame 22." Her bow was bent six inches to port.
Although MIAMI was the only cruiser to suffer structural damage in the typhoon, ASTORIA sailor Deno Dolci thought otherwise at the time. While enduring "ninety-foot seas, higher than the ship's bridge," Dolci remembers "hearing the rivets creaking below decks."
From Morison's Liberation of the Philippines:
[By afternoon] every ship was laboring heavily; hardly any two were in visual contact; many lay dead, rolling in the trough of the sea... Sailors peered out on such a scene as they had never witnessed before, and hoped to never see again. The weather was so thick and dirty that sea and sky seemed fused in one aqueous element.
Herbert Blodgett later wrote:
All hands had been warned to stay inside and not go out on the weather decks, so naturally I made my way up inside the aft superstructure as high as I could go (there was no one on duty in that whole area who might have stopped me.) I stepped out on a tiny platform at the highest point and just held on tight to watch the spectacle.
As I stood there in the aft fire control area I watched with tremendous interest as the ASTORIA rolled from side to side while pitching up and down like a cork. The most fascinating thing to see was to watch the bow struggle to come up from under water, shaking, quivering, creating spray that came back over the bridge, all the way back to me, soaking me to the skin.
USS ASTORIA ship's photographer Herman Schnipper recalled:
The typhoon was so intense that we were prevented from going topside for fear of being washed overboard. I could not use my photo equipment during the typhoon because of the soaking rain and heavy seas. If you looked up, you would see a wall of water come crashing down over the ship.
We were not able to use the hatchways and the watertight doors were too hard to handle. I was being slammed against the bulkheads as I managed to slowly make my way down the ship's passageways as it rolled and pitched--as if it were a cork on the open seas.
I managed to reach the bridge, where I could read the inclinometer. It indicated how much the ship was rolling before it would capsize, which it came very close to doing. I then tried to take pictures of the surrounding seas and ships from the bridge, but I could not see through all that water for almost two days.
1800
By early evening the worst of the storm had passed. Third Fleet was scattered over an area of 3000 square miles of ocean. Although several ships had already been directed back to Ultihi for repair, the overall state of the fleet had yet to be ascertained. At 1848 Halsey ordered a search to begin for men overboard.
From Calhoun's Typhoon: the Other Enemy:
As the 18th of December passed into history, the Commander Third Fleet could not possibly have had any real appreciation of the magnitude of the disaster that had just befallen his ships. Not until the 19th did the tragic picture begin to unfold.
19 December 1944
Sometime after midnight, the destroyer escort USS TABBERER DE-418 conveyed a message to Halsey via another ship stating:
Now engaged in picking up survivors ofHULL HULL
The TABBERER went on to report her own damage, including the fact that her foremast had been torn down by gale winds during the storm. Radar and radio gone, she was operating on emergency equipment and had barely managed to convey her message to a nearby ship.
USS TABBERER DE-418 as she looked on 19 December 1944.
-U.S. Navy photo reproduced from Typhoon: the Other Enemy, Calhoun
As reports came in through the night, several destroyers remained unaccounted for. TABBERER stayed on station working a box search pattern despite her damage. As the day progressed, she pulled 28 more USS HULL sailors from the water.
Seas remained heavy as the fleet started to recover from the storm. Cleanup operations began and refueling operations finally took place. Although three DDs were still missing and three CVLs were detached back to Ulithi for repairs, Halsey and McCain were mindful of their obligation to return to Mindoro Operations and provide precious air cover. Getting back into the fight was top priority.
There was no time to lose--lives hung in the balance both in the surrounding waters and back atMindoro . Fueling and resupply took place with urgency. Ships of the Fast Carrier Task Force prepared to return to the Philippines
Sometime after midnight, the destroyer escort USS TABBERER DE-418 conveyed a message to Halsey via another ship stating:
Now engaged in picking up survivors of
The TABBERER went on to report her own damage, including the fact that her foremast had been torn down by gale winds during the storm. Radar and radio gone, she was operating on emergency equipment and had barely managed to convey her message to a nearby ship.
USS TABBERER DE-418 as she looked on 19 December 1944.
-U.S. Navy photo reproduced from Typhoon: the Other Enemy, Calhoun
As reports came in through the night, several destroyers remained unaccounted for. TABBERER stayed on station working a box search pattern despite her damage. As the day progressed, she pulled 28 more USS HULL sailors from the water.
Seas remained heavy as the fleet started to recover from the storm. Cleanup operations began and refueling operations finally took place. Although three DDs were still missing and three CVLs were detached back to Ulithi for repairs, Halsey and McCain were mindful of their obligation to return to Mindoro Operations and provide precious air cover. Getting back into the fight was top priority.
There was no time to lose--lives hung in the balance both in the surrounding waters and back at
Herman Schnipper was finally able to take photos once the storm had passed. This image from 19 December 1944 shows
--photo taken by USS ASTORIA ship's photographer Herman Schnipper
CLICK IMAGE TO ENLARGE
This track chart from 17-18 December shows the erratic course taken by Third Fleet in attempts to reach four successive refueling points before suffering the full force of the typhoon.
-map modified from The Liberation of the Philippines, Morison
The burned-out hangar deck of USS MONTEREY as she limped back to Ulithi.
-U.S. Navy photo reproduced from Sea Cobra, Melton, Jr.
Destroyed F6F Hellcats lay piled in the elevator of USS ALTAMAHA , circa 19 December 1944.
-U.S. Navy photo reproduced from Typhoon: the Other Enemy, Calhoun
Although USS ASTORIA had weathered the storm well, her Kingfisher floatplanes had not. As the ship was refueled and readied to return to Mindoro operations, crew members returned topside to assess the damage on the ship's fantail.
CLICK PHOTO TO ENLARGE
Crew members begin work on an OS2N-1 Kingfisher on ASTORIA's starboard catapult. The plane's port wing is crumpled. Note the M-1926 life belt on the man at left.
-photo taken by and courtesy of USS ASTORIA ship's photographer Herman Schnipper
CLICK PHOTO TO ENLARGE
A second view of the damaged starboard-side plane. The "gooney bird" had been lashed in place on the catapult, and structural damage is visible on main and starboard wing pontoons.
-photo taken by and courtesy of USS ASTORIA ship's photographer Herman Schnipper
A third photo from 19 December 1944 clearly shows the extent of damage to the plane's wing. Note the sailor at right still wearing foul weather gear.
-photo taken by USS ASTORIA ship's photographer Herman Schnipper
20 December 1944
With fueling operations completed, the battered and reassembled Fast Carrier Task Force began its return to the Philippines. Halsey had promised MacArthur that his ships would be back on station to resume air strikes the next day.
Halsey hoped to now employ the storm to his advantage, advancing behind it to mask the approach of his ships. However, the typhoon continued to thwart his plans. As the fleet closed in on the Philippines, it began to overtake the now-slowing storm. Typhoon Cobra stalled over Luzon, rendering it impossible to resume air operations.
Overnight Halsey radioed to MacArthur: "Regret unable to strike on 21st due to impossible sea conditions. Am retiring eastward." With that statement, fast carrier support of Mindoro Operations ended. Task Force 38 turned to the southeast and headed back to Ulithi for much-needed rest and repair.
In the early morning of 20 December, Halsey had received a report from the escort carrier RUDYERD BAY that carried with it more devastating news. Overnight one of the DEs engaged in the search for survivors had recovered five men from a second lost destroyer, USS SPENCE. Like HULL, SPENCE had rolled and taken water. The survivors reported the sinking happened so quickly that it was unlikely that many men survived.
So at the time ASTORIA and the Fast Carrier Task Force broke off operations and prepared to return to anchorage, two ships had been confirmed lost. A third destroyer was known to be missing--USS MONAGHAN--and many other ships had suffered significant damage. Hundreds of sailors were feared lost at sea, and the search for survivors continued.
It would take several more days for the full cost of Typhoon Cobra to become clear.
With fueling operations completed, the battered and reassembled Fast Carrier Task Force began its return to the Philippines. Halsey had promised MacArthur that his ships would be back on station to resume air strikes the next day.
Halsey hoped to now employ the storm to his advantage, advancing behind it to mask the approach of his ships. However, the typhoon continued to thwart his plans. As the fleet closed in on the Philippines, it began to overtake the now-slowing storm. Typhoon Cobra stalled over Luzon, rendering it impossible to resume air operations.
Overnight Halsey radioed to MacArthur: "Regret unable to strike on 21st due to impossible sea conditions. Am retiring eastward." With that statement, fast carrier support of Mindoro Operations ended. Task Force 38 turned to the southeast and headed back to Ulithi for much-needed rest and repair.
In the early morning of 20 December, Halsey had received a report from the escort carrier RUDYERD BAY that carried with it more devastating news. Overnight one of the DEs engaged in the search for survivors had recovered five men from a second lost destroyer, USS SPENCE. Like HULL, SPENCE had rolled and taken water. The survivors reported the sinking happened so quickly that it was unlikely that many men survived.
So at the time ASTORIA and the Fast Carrier Task Force broke off operations and prepared to return to anchorage, two ships had been confirmed lost. A third destroyer was known to be missing--USS MONAGHAN--and many other ships had suffered significant damage. Hundreds of sailors were feared lost at sea, and the search for survivors continued.
It would take several more days for the full cost of Typhoon Cobra to become clear.
Continue to CHAPTER 8: The New Year and OPERATION MIKE I
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Sources:
Blodgett, Herbert. "Remembering Typhoon Cobra." U.S. Navy Cruiser Sailors Association Quarterly, Summer 2006, pp. 29-30.
Calhoun, C. Raymond. Typhoon: The Other Enemy.
Drury, Bob and Clavin, Tom. Halsey’s Typhoon.
Melton, Jr.,Buckner F. Sea Cobra.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of
Peddie, Jim. Private collection of ASTORIA CL-90 documents.
Schnipper, Herman. Excerpt from “Typhoon Cobra: December 18, 1944.” The Jerseyman, December 2003, p.10
Schnipper, Herman. Private photo collection.
USS MIAMI CL-89 cruise book. 1946.
www.navsource.org cruiser photo archive.
